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1953 The
Nobel Peace Prize to General Marshall
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It is announced
that the 1953 Nobel Peace Prize will go to US General George
Catlett Marshall, General President American Red Cross, ex-Secretary
of State and of Defense, and Delegate to the UN, for originating,
after World War II, the European Recovery Program (Marshall
Plan), which he first suggested in a 05 June 1947 address..
When Cadet First Captain
George Catlett Marshall graduated from the Virginia Military
Institute, the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament
was meeting to discuss the awarding of Nobel's Peace Prize
for the first time. And on the day when Marshall, who had
not yet completed his twenty-first year, received a letter
from the Adjutant General of the Army informing him that
the examining board had found him eminently suitable for
appointment to the Regular Army and that his commission would
be issued to him after his twenty-first birthday - on that
very day the first Peace Prize was awarded in Oslo. It was
given to Henri Dunant, who had founded the Red Cross, and
to Frédéric Passy, who had organized the first French peace
society and was a pioneer in the work for international arbitration
agreements.
If anybody at that time had
told Lieutenant George Marshall that fifty years later he
would not only be president of the American Red Cross, but
also that he himself would some day receive the Peace Prize
- the prediction would hardly have been believed and still
less welcomed. Young George Marshall may have seen himself
as a future general; but he had a long way to travel before
he arrived at the clear and passionate understanding that
the final object to be obtained by war, the only justifiable
goal, is to make another war impossible. It was a way that
would take him over larger areas of the earth and the oceans
and under the skies than any commander has traveled before
him, and let him see more battlefields and a greater devastation
than any general has seen before him, and let him plan and
direct larger armies and fleets and air forces than history
has ever known.
Two things stand out for those
trying to follow Marshall's development. On the one hand
the insatiable desire to learn, to know, to understand, and
on the other hand his keen and wide-awake interest in the
individual soldier, his indefatigable work for the welfare
of the soldier. Both things have had a far-reaching influence
on his work and on the spiritual and social evolution of
his mind.
His eagerness to find out
everything about the human beings for whom he felt responsible
made him a sometimes rather terrifying phenomenon among his
contemporaries. Twenty-one years old, he was made commanding
officer of some of the small and utterly lonely outposts
in the Philippines; he studied the language and customs and
mentality of the natives; he realized that the discipline
he valued so highly depended first of all on his own self-discipline
and his capacity for keeping his men intelligently occupied,
for giving them tasks which could awaken their interest.
Two words above all others became his guide - as he underlined
it years later in an address to the graduating class at his
old military school - the words honor and self-sacrifice.
The young officer demanded
much from his men, but still more from himself. When he graduated
from V.M. I. after four years, there was not a single demerit
beside his name. And so it has continued throughout his life.
His record has always been perfectly clean and bright. He
was as straight and erect morally as he was physically. Wherever
he was sent by his superiors he won the same reputation for
eminent ability. Typical of the high esteem in which he was
held is what happened in 1916 when he returned to the States
from his second long stay in the Philippines. He took over
the training program of a camp in Utah; and when the camp
closed, the commanding officer was required to make an efficiency
report on the officers under his command. One standard question
is: «Would you desire to have him under your immediate command
in peace and in war?»
The Colonel wrote in reply
concerning Marshall: «Yes, but I would prefer to serve under
his command... In my judgment there are not five officers
in the Army so well qualified as he to command a division
in the field.» The Colonel then recommended that he be promoted
to brigadier general, notwithstanding regulations, and then
added to underscore his statement: «He is my junior by over
1800 files.»
With this reputation and such
military recommendations, Marshall sailed for France in June,
1917, with the first ship in the first convoy of American
troops. The incredible want of preparedness, the confusion,
the chaos, the lack of arms and munitions which resulted
in 25,000 casualties in this first division of 27,000 were
destined to be Marshall's nightmare for many years to come.
It was made his task to organize both this division and others;
he became chief of operations of the division and later the
aide to General Pershing. In the American official military
records it is stated laconically: «He was assigned to general
headquarters at Chaumont and given the task of drafting the
plans for the St. Mihiel offensive... As that battle got
under way, he was given the task of transferring some 500'000
soldiers and 2700 guns to the Argonne front in preparation
for that battle.» He was made a temporary major, lieutenant
colonel, and colonel; he was recommended for promotion to
brigadier general by General Pershing whose right-hand man
he had become. Pershing's recommendation, however, was not
accepted by higher authority, and after the Armistice Marshall
became captain once more; for under American law promotion
in times of peace can only be given under the strictest rules
of seniority. And Marshall had to wait for fifteen years
before he was made a colonel again.
It is not hard to understand
why, once made chief of staff, he demanded that the rules
of promotion be amended. The amendment was passed in September,
1940, and before the end of the year a certain Major Eisenhower
was made colonel and then brigadier general, jumping 366
senior colonels.
During the years between the
wars, Marshall was stationed in Tientsin for three years.
And just as in the Philippines he had become an authority
on the history and ethnography of the islands, so in Tientsin
he studied Chinese civilization, history, and language. He
was the only American officer who could examine Chinese witnesses
that appeared before him without the aid of interpreters.
And his few spare hours he utilized to learn to write Chinese.
During the years of depression
when he was colonel once again, the soldiers' pay was reduced
to such an extent that the married men suffered real hardship,
and their regimental commander started his first Marshall
aid. He taught his troops to raise chickens and hogs; he
showed them how to start vegetable gardens. He instituted
a lunch-pail system by which, on the payment of fifteen cents,
each member of the family was fed; the price was the same,
however many members there were in the family. He and Mrs.
Marshall ate the same dinner so that it should not smack
of condescending charity. Marshall had under his command
an ever increasing number of C.C.C. camps, that curious attempt
to combine some kind of military training with the effort
to fight unemployment. For the undernourished, anemic, helpless
young men of these camps he had an absorbing interest. He
organized schools for them, had them start news-sheets, amateur
theatricals; he had their teeth taken care of; he stopped
all drunkenness among them. And when Marshall in 1938 became
assistant chief of staff and then deputy chief and in 1939
was appointed chief of staff, he took with him to Washington
this active sympathy for the private soldier, this strong
feeling that the soldier has needs other than the merely
physical. The United States at that time had an active army
of approximately 174,000 enlisted men scattered over 130
posts, camps, and stations. In Marshall's first biennial
report on the state of the armed forces he remarks:
«As an army we were ineffective.
Our equipment, modern at the conclusion of the World War,
was now, in a large measure, obsolescent. In fact, during
the postwar period, continuous paring of appropriations had
reduced the Army virtually to the status of that of a third-rate
power.»
The United States had no military
strength that could prevent war or even an attack on America.
And Marshall, who saw the total war approaching and his own
country powerless, clearly realized the truth of Alfred Nobel's
words: «Good intentions alone can never secure peace.»
It was during these years
before America was attacked that the ground had to be laid
for the later overwhelming war effort. It was during these
years that Mrs. Marshall, who was closest to him, prayed
every night: «O, Lord, grant him time.»
The task before Marshall,
the burdens he had to shoulder during these years of war,
seemed beyond the power of man to bear. That he did not break
down was probably due to what Senator Russell expressed in
the words: «Most men are slaves of their ambition. General
Marshall is the slave of his duties.»
This deep-rooted, one might
say fanatic, sense of duty imposed upon him an iron self-discipline
which came close to having the character of a mystic faith.
He made it articulate in the most spontaneous and open speech
he had ever made. In June, 1941, he gave an address at Trinity
College, an Episcopalian institution in Hartford, Connecticut.
He himself belongs to the Episcopalian faith and is an active
churchgoer. He said in his opening remarks: «I know that
being with you here today is good for my soul.» Then he added:
«If I were back in my office, I would not be using the word
soul.» He goes on to define what he means by discipline;
his doing so makes this address important for the understanding
of the man and his work.
«We are replacing force of
habit of body with force of habit of mind. We are basing
the discipline of the individual on respect rather than on
fear... It is morale that wins the victory. It is not enough
to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that
decides the issue.
The soldier's heart, the soldier's
spirit, the soldier's soul, are everything. Unless the soldier's
soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself
and his commander and his country in the end... It is morale
that wins the victory. . . The French never found an adequate
"dictionary" definition for the word... It is more than a
word - more than any one word, or several words, can measure.
Morale is a state of mind. It is steadfastness and courage
and hope. It is confidence and zeal and loyalty. It is élan,
esprit de corps and determination. It is staying power, the
spirit which endures to the end - the will to win. With it
all things are possible, without it everything else, planning,
preparation, production, count for naught. I have just said
it is the spirit which endures to the end. And so it is.»
This remarkable address is
at the same time a creed and a program. It is the only speech
in which Marshall directly and openly expressed the ideas
which occupied him most - outside his daily work. «We are
building that morale - not on supreme confidence in our ability
to conquer and subdue other peoples; not in reliance on things
of steel and the super-excellence of guns and planes and
bombsights. We are building it on things infinitely more
potent. We are building it on belief, for it is what men
believe that makes them invincible. We have sought for something
more than enthusiasm, something finer and higher than optimism
or self-confidence, something not merely of the intellect
or the emotions but rather something in the spirit of the
man, something encompassed only by the soul. This army of
ours already possesses a morale based on what we allude to
as the noblest aspirations of mankind - on the spiritual
forces which rule the world and will continue to do so. Let
me call it the morale of omnipotence. With your endorsement
and support this omnipotent morale will be sustained as long
as the things of the spirit are stronger than the things
of earth.»
But after the Trinity address
Marshall retired behind his protective armor. And the passion
always smoldering in his mind was not expressed in words
until 1945 when he wrote his biennial report on the course
of the war; in this his words of sympathy for the common
soldier have an almost explosive quality: «It is impossible
for the Nation to compensate for the services of a fighting
man. There is no pay scale that is high enough to buy the
services of a single soldier during even a few minutes of
the agony of combat, the physical miseries of the campaign,
or of the extreme personal inconvenience of leaving his home
to go out to the most unpleasant and dangerous spots on earth
to serve his Nation.»
Nobel's Peace Prize is not
given to Marshall for what he accomplished during the war.
Nevertheless, what he has done, after the war, for peace
is a corollary to this achievement, and it is this great
work for the establishment of peace which the Nobel Committee
has wanted to honor. But two documents give some idea of
General Marshall's importance to the democratic world during
the years of war. When the victory was won on May 8, 1945,
Marshall was summoned to the office of the secretary of war,
the venerable Republican Henry Stimson, one time law partner
of Elihu Root, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for
1912. Mr. Stimson had invited fourteen generals and high
officials to be present. The seventy-eight-year-old statesman
then turned to Marshall and said: «I want to acknowledge
my great personal debt to you, Sir, in common with the whole
country. No one who is thinking of himself can rise to true
heights. You have never thought of yourself... I have never
seen a task of such magnitude performed by man. It is rare
in late life to make new friends; at my age it is a slow
process, but there is no one for whom I have such deep respect
and, I think, greater affection. I have seen a great many
soldiers in my lifetime and you, Sir, are the finest soldier
I have ever known. It is fortunate for this country that
we have you in this position!»
And when Marshall at his own
request resigned as chief of staff in November, 1945, he
received from his British colleagues in the combined chiefs
of staff a message which is surely without parallel. It was
signed by Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Alan Brooke
(now Lord Alanbrooke), by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cunningham
of Hyndhope, and by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Portal
of Hungerford. It reads: « On your retirement after six years
as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, we, your British
colleagues in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, send you this
message of farewell. We regret that Field Marshal Sir John
Dill and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, two of your
greatest friends and admirers, are not alive today to add
their names to ours. As architect and builder of the finest
and most powerful Army in American History, your name will
be honored among those of the greatest soldiers of your own
or any other country. Throughout your association with us
in the higher direction of the armed forces of America and
Britain, your unfailing wisdom, high principles, and breadth
of view have commanded the deep respect and admiration of
us all. Always you have honored us by your frankness, charmed
us by your courtesy, and inspired us by your singleness of
purpose and your selfless devotion to our common cause. Above
all would we record our thankfulness to you for the leading
part which you have always taken in forging and strengthening
the bond of mutual trust and cooperation between the armed
forces of our two countries which has contributed so much
to final victory and will, we believe, endure to the benefit
of civilization in the years to come. In bidding farewell
to you who have earned our personal affection no less than
our professional respect, we would address to you a tribute
written more than 200 years ago. ... Friend to truth! Of
soul sincere, In action faithful, and in honor clear; Who
broke no promise, served no private end, Who gained no title,
and who lost no friend.»
Between Mr. Stimson's words
of national gratitude and the message from the British chiefs
of staff, we have General Marshall's third biennial report
which contains both his military testament and an introduction
to what later came to be called the Marshall Aid. It is particularly
the last section of the report which is of importance here.
Marshall called it «For the Common Defense». He opened with
the statement that to fulfill its responsibility for protection
of the nation against foreign enemies, the army must project
its planning beyond the immediate future.
«For years men have been concerned
with individual security... But effective insurance against
the disasters which have slaughtered millions of people and
leveled their homes is long overdue.»
He then points to Washington's
plans for a national military policy and goes on:
«We must start, I think, with
a correction of the tragic misunderstanding that a security
policy is a war policy. War has been defined by a people
who have thought a lot about it - the Germans. They have
started most of the recent ones. The German soldier-philosopher
Clausewitz described war as a special violent form of political
action. Frederick of Prussia, who left Germany the belligerent
legacy which has now destroyed her, viewed war as a device
to enforce his will whether he was right or wrong. He held
that with an invincible offensive military force he could
win any political argument. It is the doctrine Hitler carried
to the verge of complete success. This is the doctrine of
Japan. It is a criminal doctrine, and like other forms of
crime, it has cropped up again and again since man began
to live with his neighbors in communities and nations. There
has long been an effort to outlaw war for exactly the same
reason that man has outlawed murder. But the law prohibiting
murder does not of itself prevent murder. It must be enforced.
The enforcing power, however, must be maintained on a strictly
democratic basis. There must not be a large standing army
subject to the behest of a group of schemers. The citizen-soldier
is the guarantee against such a misuse of power.»
He concludes by emphasizing:
«If this Nation is to remain
great, it must bear in mind now and in the future that war
is not the choice of those who wish passionately for peace.
It is the choice of those who are willing to resort to violence
for political advantage.»
Marshall had hardly had a
week's rest after his resignation as chief of staff when
President Truman sent him to China as a special ambassador
to try to stop the pending civil war between the Communists
and the Kuomintang, i.e. Chiang Kai-shek. He did not succeed;
for when Marshall was gone, neither of the two parties honored
the agreements they had undertaken. But what Marshall had
seen and experienced in China strengthened the conviction
which the devastations of the war had planted in his mind
and which now received initial amplification in his report
from China to President Truman: «It was his [Marshall's]
opinion that steps had to be taken to assist China and its
people in the increasingly serious economic situation and
to facilitate the efforts being made toward peace and unity
in China... General Marshall felt that Chinese political
and military unity could only be consolidated and made lasting
through the rehabilitation of the country and the permanent
general improvement of economic conditions.»
It is an opinion which Marshall
in another connection has formulated more generally in these
words: «The historians have failed in their task; they should
have been able to discover and reveal the causes of war and
make war impossible.»
And when in 1947 Marshall
at the insistent request of President Truman accepted an
appointment as secretary of state, it was because he believed
that he saw the causes of war and chaos and because he intended
to remove those causes insofar as humanly possible, and in
this way make war impossible.
His apprehension, his fear
of war, his feeling that another war would mean the complete
collapse of human civilization is closely akin to the apprehension
in Nobel's mind when he was drafting his will. In 1893 he
wrote in a letter:
«I should like to dispose
of a part of my fortune by founding a prize to be given every
five years (say six times; for if we have not succeeded in
reforming our present system within thirty years we shall
inevitably revert to barbarism). This prize would be awarded
to the man or woman who had achieved most in furthering the
idea of a general peace in Europe.» And he also wrote: «Une
nouvelle tyrannie-celle des bas fonds-s'agite dans les ténèbres,
et on croit entendre son grondement lointain.»
Marshall wanted to prevent
what Nobel feared. Less than four months after entering the
State Department, he presented his plan for that tremendous
aid to Europe which has become inseparably connected with
his name. He stated in his famous speech at Harvard University:
«Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine
but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its
purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the
world so as to permit the emergence of political and social
conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance,
I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various
crises develop. Any assistance that this government may render
in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.»
Marshall carried out his plan,
fighting for it for two years in public and in Congress.
And when the Marshall Plan had become a living reality, with
the agencies for its operation established, Marshall stepped
back.
But again he was called to
service, being made secretary of defense in September, 1950.
When he assumed this responsibility, it was only to be in
a position to put into effect his idea of building the future
defense of the United States on a democratic conscription
and not on a standing army. When this had been accomplished,
he retired once more, this time to realize at last the dream
of his life - to grow a vegetable garden on his small estate
in Virginia.
The years that have gone by
since he submitted his program have demonstrated its constructive
character. And the organs which have grown from the Marshall
Aid have, more than anything else in these difficult years,
contributed to what Nobel termed «the idea of a general peace
in Europe» and to a realistic materialization of the idea
Nobel in his testament called brotherhood among nations,
although within a more narrow framework than Marshall had
desired. The 1953 Nobel Peace Prize, therefore, is awarded
to George Catlett Marshall.
George Catlett Marshall (31 Dec 1880 - 16 Oct 1959),
the US's foremost soldier during World War II, served as chief
of staff from 1939 to 1945, building and directing the largest
army in history. A diplomat, he acted as secretary of state
from 1947 to 1949, formulating the «Marshall Plan», an unprecedented
program of economic and military aid to foreign nations.
Marshall's father owned a prosperous
coal business in Pennsylvania, but the boy, deciding to become
a soldier, enrolled at the Virginia Military Institute from
which he was graduated in 1901 as senior first captain of the
Corps of Cadets. After serving in posts in the Philippines and
the United States, Marshall was graduated with honors from the
Infantry-Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth in 1907 and from
the Army Staff College in 1908. The young officer distinguished
himself in a variety of posts in the next nine years, earning
an appointment to the General Staff in World War I and sailing
to France with the First Division. He achieved fame and promotion
for his staff work in the battles of Cantigny, Aisne-Marne,
St. Mihiel, and Meuse-Argonne. After acting as aide-de-camp
to General Pershing from 1919 to 1924, Marshall served in China
from 1924 to 1927, and then successively as instructor in the
Army War College in 1927, as assistant commandant of the Infantry
School from 1927 to 1932, as commander of the Eighth Infantry
in 1933, as senior instructor to the Illinois National Guard
from 1933 to 1936, and as commander, with the rank of brigadier
general, of the Fifth Infantry Brigade from 1936 to 1938. In
July, 1938, Marshall accepted a post with the General Staff
in Washington, D. C., and in September, 1939, was named chief
of staff, with the rank of general, by President Roosevelt.
He became general of the army in 1944, the year in which Congress
created that five-star rank.
In his position as chief of staff,
Marshall urged military readiness prior to the attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941, later became responsible for the building, supplying,
and, in part, the deploying of over eight million soldiers.
From 1941 he was a member of the policy committee that supervised
the atomic studies engaged in by American and British scientists.
The war over, Marshall resigned in November, 1945.
But Marshall could not resign
from public service; his military career ended, he took up a
diplomatic career. He had been associated with diplomatic events
while chief of staff, for he participated in the conference
on the Atlantic Charter (1941-1942), and in those at Casablanca
(1943), Quebec (1943), Cairo-Teheran (1943), Yalta (1945), Potsdam
(1945), and in many others of lesser import. In late 1945 and
in 1946, he represented President Truman on a special mission
to China, then torn by civil war; in January, 1947, he accepted
the Cabinet position of secretary of state, holding it for two
years. In the spring of 1947 he outlined in a speech at Harvard
University the plan of economic aid which history has named
the «Marshall Plan».
For one year during the Korean
War General Marshall was secretary of defense, a civilian post
in the U. S. Cabinet. Having resigned from this post in September,
1951, three months before his seventy-first birthday, he retired
from public service, thereafter performing those ceremonial
duties the public comes to expect of its famous men. |